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Abstract
Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes a⁄ect their
job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain.
Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the iden-
tity of those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of characterizing con-
strained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in
previous literature. We construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance
where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled. The model is used
to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must
be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobserv-
able job-search. In particular, we derive closed-form solutions showing that
when the moving/retraining incentive constraint binds, unemployment bene-
￿ts should increase over the unemployment spell, with an initial period with
low bene￿ts and an increase after this period has expired.
JEL Classi￿cation: J65, J64, E24
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tion
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11 Introduction
An important feature of the modern welfare state is the existence of an extensive
unemployment insurance (UI) system. It is now well established that the design of
the unemployment insurance a⁄ects the incidence of unemployment by distorting
the incentives of unemployed to search for a job (see, e.g., Holmlund (1998) for
a survey). This has motivated a growing literature on how the UI system should
be designed to make an optimal trade-o⁄ between providing good insurance, on
the one hand, and not distorting the incentives too much, on the other. The key
informational friction in this literature is that search activity cannot be monitored,
so su¢ cient search incentives must be provided.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. The ￿rst contribution is to focus on
an important informational friction that has been largely neglected in the litera-
ture. We will consider the case when individuals who become unemployed have
di⁄erent opportunities to ￿nd a new job. However, we assume that the insurer
cannot (perfectly) observe these di⁄erences. Speci￿cally, we assume that some, but
not all, unemployed can increase the probability of being hired by undertaking a
costly investment, e.g., by retraining or moving to a location with better employ-
ment prospects. Under the realistic assumption that the insurer is unable to observe
who has this option, an incentive problem arises and failure to take this into ac-
count may lead to sub-optimal UI-design. One direct way of mitigating the problem
would be to o⁄er subsidies to moving or retraining. While we will discuss this case
at the end of the paper, our main case is when full cost-compensation is not feasible,
for example because the insurer cannot fully distinguish voluntary and involuntary
job-separations.
Although an empirical investigation is outside the scope of this paper, we argue
that the consequences of not providing reasonable incentives for people to move or
retrain may be of substantial quantitative importance. For instance, Bartel (1979)
documents that the proportion of geographical mobility in the U.S. caused by the de-
cision to change jobs is one-half of all migration decisions for young workers and one
2third of all migration decisions for workers aged above 45. Furthermore, geograph-
ical mobility is substantially lower in continental Europe, and Hassler, Rodr￿guez
Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005) document in panel-data a negative correla-
tion between geographical mobility and UI-generosity as well as between mobility
and aggregate unemployment rates. Other empirical documentations of the link
between unemployment and geographical mobility are DaVanzo (1978), Pissarides
and Wadsworth (1989) and McCormick (1997).
The second contribution of our paper is more methodological. Search incentives
and incentives to move are generally not independent and should therefore be jointly
analyzed. The reason why moving incentives are not included in the standard analy-
sis is that multiple incentive constraints with di⁄erent characteristics are di¢ cult
to analyze. Including both search and moving/retraining incentive constraints com-
plicates the analysis, since it is di¢ cult to evaluate which of many constraints are
binding, in particular when unemployment bene￿ts are allowed to be non-constant.
Suppose, for example, that the bene￿t schedule contains x tiers, so that the bene￿t
level b is an element of B ￿ fb1;b2;::bxg. The incentive constraint for an individual
at a particular tier then depends on bene￿ts in all tiers that the individual could
eventually end up, in general all elements of B. The methodological contribution of
the paper is to show that the problem of ￿nding the optimal bene￿t structure can
be formulated in such a way that that all incentive constraints are linear and par-
allel or independent of each other. It is then immediate to check which constraints
are binding and optimal bene￿ts can easily be characterized, both graphically and
analytically. We will provide analytical expressions for the (constrained) optimal
bene￿t schedule and, in particular, focus on the issue of whether bene￿ts should
increase or decrease over time. Our model easily lends itself to allowing multiple in-
centive problems and adding, for example, a moral hazard problem in job-retention
e⁄ort as in Wang and Williamson (1996) should be straightforward.
There exists an extensive literature on the optimal design of social insurance
schemes under moral hazard. In one line of paper, the question is how to opti-
3mally set a time invariant bene￿t level in a two state setting (e.,g., employment
and unemployment) and an individually costly and unobserved action (job search)
determines the transition probability from one of the states. A seminal contribution
is Baily (1978), who use a two period model to derive a formula for the optimal
bene￿t level that only depends on three parameters: the degree of risk aversion, the
consumption-smoothing bene￿t of UI, and the elasticity of unemployment duration
to the bene￿t rate. Chetty (2006) shows that a generalized formula, including also
the degree of prudence, is applicable in a surprisingly more general and dynamic
setting, provided the focus is on time invariant bene￿ts and two states. Given these
results, empirical analysis on the sensitivity of consumption and unemployment du-
ration to the bene￿t level, like for example David Card and Weber (2007), can
then be used to "calibrate" the formula for the optimal bene￿t level and no direct
evidence on, for example, the ability individual has to self-insure, is needed.
Our work allows time varying bene￿ts and is therefore more related to the line of
papers following the in￿ uential papers by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997). Here, the focus is on the optimal time pro￿le of bene￿ts chosen
by a planner who can control consumption of the individual but not her search
intensity. A key result here is that the optimal trade-o⁄ between insurance and
incentive provision implies that consumption should fall over time as long as the
individual remains unemployed. A standard interpretation of this result is that
unemployment bene￿ts should fall over time. However, this interpretation relies
on the assumption that the insurer can perfectly control individual consumption
by determining the bene￿t levels. In a recent line of papers (e.g., Pavoni (2006),
Arpad and Pavoni (2005), Werning (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2005)), the
individual is allowed to make her own consumption decisions by allowing access to
a perfect market for saving and borrowing. Then, as assets are run down during an
unemployment spell, consumption falls over time by choice of the individual also
with constant bene￿ts. In fact, under constant absolute risk-aversion, there is no
need to a⁄ect the rate of decline of consumption and a constant bene￿t level is
4optimal if the moral hazard problem is stationary (see Werning (2002) and Shimer
and Werning (2005)).
The analytical tractability of our model hinges on some key assumptions. First,
we allow the individual to make her own consumption decisions by allowing access
to a safe bond. Second, we assume constant absolute risk-aversion. These assump-
tions imply search incentives to be independent of asset holdings.1 Speci￿cally, the
absence of wealth e⁄ects implies that we can induce people to voluntarily move or
retrain, as well as to search for a job, using simple bene￿t schemes with a limited
number of bene￿t levels that are independent of the full employment history of the
agent.2 Regarding our assumption of access to a market for borrowing and saving,
we want to stress that there is empirical evidence indicating that precautionary sav-
ing is used to self-insure against unemployment risk. Using PSID, Gruber (1997)
￿nds that, in the absence of UI, consumption falls by only 22% when an individual
becomes unemployed, showing that individuals are able to smooth consumption
also when there is no UI. Similarly, Engen and Gruber (2001) show that UI crowds
out ￿nancial savings, indicating that households use ￿nancial markets to self-insure
against unemployment risk.3 It is nevertheless clear that neither of the key assump-
tions is perfectly realistic and a quantitative analysis might require wealth e⁄ects,
either because of non-constant absolute risk aversion and/or because of variations
in the bite of liquidity constraints. However, we hope that illustrating a mecha-
1Other frictions, like irreversibilities in durables consumption and other consumption commit-
ments, would also generically make incentive constraints wealth dependent. Recently, Chetty and
Szeidl (2007) show that consumption commitments may a⁄ect risk preferences and their wealth
dependence.
2With decreasing absolute riskaversion or ￿nancial frictions, it could be the case that unemployed
individuals do not retrain or move until they have run down their assets to some critical level
and then decide to move. A similar case could arise if unemployed individuals learn about their
prospects over time, starting their unemployment spell with optimistic beliefs and then turn more
pessimistic. Clearly, this would not only complicate the analysis but could also alter our results
regarding the optimal time-pro￿le of bene￿ts.
3Also if access to the formal capital market is limited, alternative means of smoothing consump-
tion may exist, see e.g., Cullen and Gruber (2000).
5nism not previously explored in the literature might provide guidance for future
quantitative work. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
The paper is structured in the following way. The model is presented in section
2, where the relevant value functions are derived in subsection 2.1. The formal
optimality problem is de￿ned and solved in section 3. In subsection 3.1, we show
the methodology in the simplest case with a constant bene￿t level and in subsection
3.2, we allow time varying bene￿ts. In section 4, the optimal insurance scheme is
characterized under di⁄erent assumptions on search and moving costs. Section 5
relaxes some of the assumptions in the previous section and section 6 concludes.
Some proofs are given in the main text, others in the appendix and the remaining
ones are available from the authors upon request.
2 The model
Consider an economy in continuous time where individuals can either be employed
or unemployed. They have access to a market for safe saving and borrowing with
an exogenous return r, equal to the subjective discount rate (possibly including a
positive probability of dying). Unemployed individuals can a⁄ect their chances of
￿nding a job. As noted in the introduction, we will focus on the case when some, but
not necessarily all, unemployed individuals can make a costly investment increasing
their chances of becoming employed. Allowing unobservable heterogeneity in this
respect creates an informational problem similar to an adverse selection problem.4
In addition, we will allow the more standard moral hazard problem where search
activity entails a ￿ ow cost.
Speci￿cally, we assume that an employed individual, who is said to be in state
1, loses her job at the exogenous rate q. With probability p 2 [0;1] those who loose
their job can undertake a costly investment. We will interpret this as representing
4There are very few papers on UI which deal with adverse selection. One recent paper is
Hagedorn, Kaul and Memmel (2003), where individuals with di⁄erent hiring rates are separated
by being o⁄ered di⁄erent ￿bene￿t menus￿ .
6a cost of moving, denoted m > 0 (for example between geographical locations or
between occupations requiring some retraining). For simplicity, we assume that the
opportunity to undertake this investment arises immediately upon separation and if
the unemployed pays this cost (￿moves￿ ), she is immediately rehired. In subsection
5.1, we relax this assumption by assuming that moving opportunities arise with a
￿nite arrival rate.
Unemployed who cannot move or decide not to move and who search for a job
￿nd one at an exogenous rate h. Searching has a cost of s ￿ 0 per unit of time.
In subsection 5.2, we instead assume that unemployed individuals can choose a
continuous hiring rate at an increasing and convex cost s(h). We may consider
search costs as representing the opportunity cost of searching, arising from, for
example, some alternative valuable activity. Whether the agent actually searches
or not and whether she has the opportunity to move are assumed to be her own
private information. To make the problem interesting, we assume that it is socially
optimal to induce individuals to search and move (if they have the opportunity).5 It
is easily shown that under this assumption, agents with the option of moving should
be induced to do so immediately. Therefore, in the optimal solution of the baseline
model, no mass of agents should be unemployed while having the opportunity to
move. In subsection 5.1, on the other hand, unemployed individuals search for both
job and moving opportunities.
A key question we want to analyze is if and how UI bene￿ts should change over
the duration of the unemployment spell. To answer this question, we make two
assumptions that will simplify the analysis and make graphical representations of
our results possible. First, we assume the bene￿t schedule to be a ladder with a
￿nite number of steps. In fact, we only allow two bene￿t levels, b2 and b3; but the
extension to any a ￿nite number of bene￿t levels is straightforward. Moreover, we
can show that our main results would not change by allowing more than two bene￿t
tiers ￿with x bene￿t tiers, only the ￿rst should have a unique value, all latter bene￿t
5We return to this assumption in subsection 5.1.
7tiers should be identical.6 Second, we assume transition between the steps in the
bene￿t schedule to occur with a constant hazard rate f: Individuals who lose their
jobs enter state 2 and receive bene￿ts b2: In state 2, they face a constant hazard
rate f of entering state 3 and then receiving bene￿ts b3:7 Motivated by real-world
practical considerations, and in contrast to, e.g., Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), we
assume that bene￿t levels can only be given conditional on current unemployment
status (2 or 3), not conditional on employment history or asset holdings.8
Given the multiple incentive constraints, an extended unemployment insurance,
where individuals can choose between di⁄erent menus, may be better than a simple
two-tier system. In subsection 5.4, we allow such a scheme, showing that our results
regarding under which conditions UI bene￿ts should be increasing and when they
should be decreasing remain valid in the case of menu-based insurance.
The simplest and most obvious way of interpreting the unemployment states
is as an indication of the passage of time: individuals in state 3 have, on average,
been unemployed longer than individuals in state 2. Therefore, we label state 2 as
short-term unemployment and state 3 as long-term unemployment. Our preferred
interpretation of the third state is that it is a purely administrative state and we
may allow the insurance provider to choose f: In this case, it is natural to assume
that search costs (s) and hiring probability (h) are the same in both states.
We may also interpret the third state as representing loss of skills during un-
employment in the sense of job-￿nding rates and search costs developing disadvan-
tageously over the unemployment spell. As an extension, we modify the model so
that with a constant instantaneous probability f, unemployed individuals su⁄er a
shock, and their search costs increase (s2 < s3) and/or their hiring probabilities
6Proof available upon request.
7This assumption implies that search incentives remain constant as long as the individual re-
mains in state 2. An alternative would be to use discrete time and assume that short-term UI
bene￿ts are paid for one period only, as done by e.g., Cahuc and Lehmann (2000). Assuming that
UI bene￿ts change after some ￿xed period of time would make search incentives depend on the
remaining time of current bene￿ts and considerably complicate the analysis with little gain.
8In fact, under CARA utility, also this assumption is innocuous.
8decrease (h2 > h3). Although this interpretation raises issues about observability,
we abstain from these and assume bene￿ts to be paid contingent on whether the
individual is in state 2 or 3.
Individuals maximize their intertemporal utility, given by
E
Z 1
0
e￿rtU (ct)dt;
where ct is consumption at time t and r is the subjective discount rate. To facil-
itate analytical solutions when individuals have access to markets for saving and
borrowing, we choose the CARA utility function
U (ct) ￿ ￿e￿￿ct;
where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. All individuals are born (enter
the labor market) as employed without assets and are identical at that point.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how an unemployment insurance sys-
tem should be constructed when there are incentive problems. To this end, we
want to remove other motives for unemployment bene￿ts than providing insur-
ance. In particular, we are in this paper not interested in motives for using the UI
system to create non-actuarial transfers between individuals with di⁄erent charac-
teristics.9 Therefore, we assume that individuals face an actuarially fair insurance.
This means that when an individual enters the labor force, the expected present
discounted value of the bene￿ts she will receive during her life-time exactly balances
the expected present discounted value of her contributions. An alternative interpre-
tation of actuarial fairness is that in a decentralized equilibrium, where individuals
can sign binding insurance contracts with competitive insurance companies when
entering their ￿rst job, actuarial fairness is identical to a break-even condition for
the insurance companies, which would be satis￿ed under perfect competition.10
9For positive implications, the redistributive elements of unemployment insurance are, however,
likely to be central. See e.g., Wright (1986).
10Directly related to the introductory discussion about wealth e⁄ects, we note that the CARA
speci￿cation implies that individual assets do not a⁄ect preference over insurance. Older employed
agents with non-zero asset holdings would therefore not want to renegotiate their contract.
9Without loss of generality, we let individuals pay lump-sum taxes, denoted ￿,
implying that
_ At = rAt + y ￿ ct ￿ ￿; (1)
except at the points in time when the cost of moving is paid, and where y 2
fw;b2 ￿ s;b3 ￿ sg, depending on the employment state. We de￿ne the average
discounted probabilities (ADP￿ s) of being in state 2 and 3, respectively, by
￿2 ￿ r
Z 1
0
e￿rt￿2;tdt;
￿3 ￿ r
Z 1
0
e￿rt￿3;tdt;
where ￿2;t and ￿3;t are the probabilities of being short-term and long-term unem-
ployed at time t, respectively, conditional on being employed at time zero, provided
that individuals who can move do so and that unemployed search for a job.11 The
actuarial fairness requirement of the UI system is now a simple linear function of
the bene￿ts
￿ = ￿2b2 + ￿3b3: (2)
2.1 Value functions and consumption
Under constant absolute risk aversion and stationary income uncertainty, the value
functions for the three states j 2 f1;2;3g can be separated
V (At;j) = W (At) ~ Vj (￿;b2;b3); (3)
11It is straightforward to calculate that
￿2 ￿
q (1 ￿ p)(h + r)
(r + h + q (1 ￿ p))(r + h + f)
;
￿3 ￿ ￿2
f
h + r
:
10where
W (At) ￿
e￿￿At
r
(4)
~ Vj ￿ ￿e￿￿cj;
and ￿j are state-dependent consumption constants such that the state dependent
consumption functions are
cj (At) = rAt + ￿j: (5)
The consumption constants ￿j are nonlinear functions of income in all states
and thus, depend on the planner choice variables ￿;b2 and b3: The constants are
found as the unique solutions to the Bellman equations for each state:12
￿1 = w ￿ ￿ ￿
q
￿
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿
￿r
(6)
￿2 = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿r
￿
f
￿
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿
￿r
￿3 = b3 ￿ s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3￿
￿r
;
where
￿2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2; (7)
￿3 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿3;
are the consumption di⁄erences between state 1 and 2 and between state 1 and 3,
respectively.
3 Optimal Insurance
Given the discussion above, the problem we set out to solve is to maximize the
ex-ante value of unemployment insurance, that is, we want to maximize the welfare
of an individual upon entering the economy. This welfare is given by V (0;1); since
12See the appendix for proof that the proposed value and consumption functions solve the Bell-
man equations.
11we assume that agents enter the economy as employed with no assets.13 Due to the
separability and the fact that W (At) is independent of the insurance system, we
immediately see that this is equivalent to maximizing ~ V1 over f￿;b2;b3g: Using the
budget constraint ￿ = ￿2b2 + ￿3b3; our objective is therefore to maximize
~ V1 (￿2b2 + ￿3b3;b2;b3) (8)
over b2 and b3 subject to the incentive constraints that unemployed individuals
voluntarily search for a job and that individuals with the opportunity to move to
get a job voluntarily do so.
In the direct formulation of the problem, the incentive constraints are highly
non-linear functions of the choice variables b2 and b3. This makes it hard to ￿nd
the binding constraints, which is necessary to ￿nd the solution. However, it turns
out that we can formulate the problem so that the incentive constraints are linear
and either parallel or orthogonal. Finding out which is binding is then trivial.
Furthermore, adding more states and incentive constraints is also very simple. We
regard this as the methodological contribution of the paper.
Finding the constrained optimal insurance now involves the following steps:
1. Note that ~ V1 ￿ ￿e￿￿c1 is a monotone transformation of ￿1. For convenience,
we therefore use ￿1 from (6) as the objective function noting that it is a func-
tion of the consumption di⁄erences. Then use (6) and the budget constraint
(2) to express ￿ in terms of the consumption di⁄erences and ￿nally use this
to substitute for ￿ in the objective function (￿1).
2. Express the incentive constraints in terms of consumption di⁄erences ￿j:
3. Maximize ￿1 over the consumption di⁄erences, subject to the incentive con-
straints.
13Obviously, we could equally well have chosen any other initial condition. Note also that the
separability implies that the insurance system that maximizes the ex-ante utility also maximizes
the utility of all employed, regardless of their history.
124. Verify that the optimal consumption di⁄erences ￿2 can be implemented by
some combination of b0
js:
3.1 Two states
For illustrative purposes, we start with the simplest case of two states, i.e., we
assume that f = 0 so unemployment bene￿ts are constant forever.
The ￿rst step is now to derive an expression for ￿1 in terms of ￿2 where the
budget constraint (2) is used to replace the tax rate: For this purpose, we subtract
the second line of (6) from the ￿rst and solve for b2: Then, we use this expression
in the budget constraint ￿ = ￿2b2 and substitute for ￿ in the ￿rst line of (6). This
yields
￿1 = ￿ + ￿2
￿
￿2 ￿
he￿￿￿2
￿r
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
; (9)
where ￿ is a constant, independent of the choice variables. Straightforward calculus
shows that (9) de￿nes ￿1 as a concave function of ￿2 with a unique maximum
at 0. The reason for ￿1 being maximized at ￿2 = 0 is obvious ￿when actuarial
insurance is available, full insurance maximizes utility. However, ￿2 = 0 is not
incentive compatible. Neither searching nor moving will occur voluntarily under full
insurance. Therefore, we turn to step 2 ￿where we ￿nd the incentive constraints.
The ICM constraint implies that a person who has lost her job and has the
opportunity to move must be induced to do so. We ￿rst note that if her assets upon
separation were At, her value immediately after moving is
V (At ￿ m;1) = ￿
1
r
e￿￿r(At￿m)e￿￿￿1;
since she has paid the moving cost, m: We compare this to the value of a one-period
deviation, i.e., the value if the individual does not move during this unemployment
spell. Immediately after being laid o⁄, her assets are At and she is unemployed,
i.e., in state 2, since she did not take the opportunity to move to get a job. Her
value is therefore,
V (At;2) = ￿
1
r
e￿￿rAte￿￿￿2:
13To induce moving, we need V (At ￿ m;1) ￿ V (At;2): It immediately follows
that this requires
￿2 ￿ rm: (10)
We label (10) the ICM-condition.
Now, consider the incentive to search. Remember that for now, we assume un-
employment bene￿ts to be ￿ at (the assumption f = 0 implies that b3 is irrelevant).
If the individual does not search, she therefore gets an income b2 ￿￿ for ever, since
she will not ￿nd a new job without searching. Without uncertainty, she consumes
exactly her total income rAt+b2￿￿ (since r coincides with the subjective discount
rate) and her utility is therefore
￿
1
r
e￿￿rAte￿￿(b2￿￿):
The utility if the individual instead searches is ￿1
re￿￿rAte￿￿￿2 so to induce
search, we clearly need
￿2 ￿ b2 ￿ ￿:
Note that the consumption of the unemployed who search is rAt + ￿2: Further-
more, her total income net of search costs is rAt +b2 ￿￿ ￿s: Therefore, the search
condition implies consumption to be strictly higher than income. Over time, the
unemployed depletes her assets and consumption therefore falls, despite the bene￿ts
being constant. The celebrated result by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997) that consumption should optimally fall over the unemployment
spell when the insurer can fully control consumption (no hidden savings) is therefore
mimicked in this case, where hidden savings are allowed.
The ￿nal part of step 2 is to express the search constraint in terms of the
consumption di⁄erence ￿2: Using the second line of (6) and setting f = 0; the
search constraint can be written
￿2 ￿ ￿
ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s
h
￿
￿
; (11)
which we label the IC2-condition. As can be seen, the incentive constraints are
simply constants and it is immediate to see which one is binding.
14The problem is now simply depicted in Figure 1, where we note that the two
constraints are parallel.
D 2
ICM
s1
0
IC2
rm
g
g ) / 1 ln( h rs - -
Figure 1: Objective function and constraints in a two-state case.
In the depicted case, it is the ICM-constraint that binds and step 3 is trivial.
Maximizing ￿1 over ￿2 subject to the ICM constraint implies
￿2 = rm:
Finally, we want to implement this. This is easily done using (6); set the di⁄er-
ence between the ￿rst and the second line equal to rm and solve for b2, giving
b2 = w + s ￿ rm ￿
q (e￿rm ￿ 1) + h(1 ￿ e￿￿rm)
￿r
: (12)
In the alternative case, where the IC2 constraint binds, we instead get
b2 = w +
ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s
h
￿
￿
￿
sq
h ￿ ￿rs
; (13)
where both expressions are unique and easily lend themselves to comparative statics.
153.2 Three states
The procedure in the case of three states is exactly analogous to the two-state case
and simply extends to any number of ￿nite states. We use (6) and the budget
constraint (2) to express ￿1 as a function of the consumption di⁄erences, now ￿2
and ￿3 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿3 (step 1). Then, we express the incentive constraints in terms of
￿2 and ￿3, check which are binding (step 2), maximize ￿1 over f￿2;￿3g subject
to the binding constraints (step 3) and ￿nd the implementing b2;b3 (step 4).
3.2.1 Objective and constraints
Using the equations for the consumption constants (6) and the budget constraint
(2), the objective becomes
￿1 = ￿2 + ￿2￿2 + ￿3￿3 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3)
q (1 ￿ p)
￿r
e￿￿2 (14)
￿ ￿2
 
h
e￿￿￿2
￿r
+ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
￿r
!
￿ ￿3h
e￿￿￿3
￿r
;
where ￿2 is an unimportant constant. In ￿gure 2, we make a graphical representation
of the objective function by drawing indi⁄erence curves in a ￿gure with ￿3 on
the x￿axis and ￿2 on the y￿axis.14 The bliss point is at full insurance, when
f￿3;￿2g = f0;0g, again, for the reason that the insurance is actuarially fair. The
indi⁄erence curves have elliptical shapes around the bliss point, of which we are only
interested in the segment in the positive quadrant, since incentive compatibility
certainly requires ￿3;￿2 ￿ 0: For the later analysis, we should note that the slope
of an indi⁄erence curve is strictly positive if ￿3 = 0 and ￿2 > 0 and that it is
downward sloping at ￿2 = ￿3, regardless of the parameter choice.15
Regarding the three incentive constraints, it is straightforward to see that they
14The indi⁄erence curves in ￿gure 2-6 are drawn for fh = 1;f = 1;q = 0:1;r = 0:05;￿ = 1;p = 0:5g
but the results below hold for all parameter values.
15Di⁄erentiating the objective function, we ￿nd the derivative of the indi⁄erence curve to be
fe￿￿￿2
r+(h+f)(1+e￿￿￿2) 2 (0;1) at ￿3 = 0 and
￿e￿￿￿2
1+ r
h+
(h+r)2
fh +
(h+r)(e￿￿￿2)
f
2 (￿1;0) at ￿2 = ￿3:
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Figure 2: Indi⁄erence curves.
are identical to the case of two states,16 i.e., the ICM is ￿2 ￿ rm and the IC2 and
IC3 constraints are,
￿2;￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r
s
h
￿
: (15)
The intuition for the fact that IC2 and IC3 are identical is simple. In our
base line case, hiring probabilities and search costs of searching individuals are the
same for long- and short-term unemployed. The incentives in terms of utility and
thus, in terms of consumption increases upon successful search, must therefore be
the same. Allowing di⁄erent search costs and/or hiring probabilities in the two
states is, however, very simple by allowing s and h to be state dependent in the
IC conditions; this is done in section 5.3. Therefore, we reach the key conclusion
that the incentive constraints for the two states (IC2 and IC3) are identical and
orthogonal in the f￿2;￿3g￿space. We emphasize that this does not mean that
only b2 (b3) is of importance for search incentives of the short-term (long-term)
unemployed. On the contrary, both b2 and b3 a⁄ect consumption and therefore
16See the appendix for a formal proof.
17incentives in all states. However, individual optimization and access to markets for
saving and borrowing imply that the value function is a monotonous transformation
of consumption. Thus, the wedge between consumption in the current state and
during employment is a su¢ cient statistic to determine whether search incentives
are su¢ ciently strong.
In the next subsection, we will use our model to characterize the optimal UI-
scheme under di⁄erent assumptions on which the constraint is binding. As in the
two-state case, the analysis is greatly simpli￿ed by the incentive constraints in
f￿3;￿2g space being linear and parallel or orthogonal. When the optimal f￿2;￿3g
are found, we ￿nd the optimal bene￿ts from the implementation mapping, which is
derived by taking the di⁄erence between lines 1 and 2 and between 1 and 3 in (6)
and solving for b2 and b3:
b2 = w + s ￿ ￿2
￿
q
￿
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿
+ h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿ f
￿
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿
￿r
; (16)
b3 = w + s ￿ ￿3 ￿
q
￿
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿
+ h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3￿
￿r
:
4 Characterization of optimal UI-schemes
In this section, we use our model to characterize (constrained) optimal unemploy-
ment insurance if search cost are low and high, respectively. In the following section,
we will extend the analysis in a few directions.
4.1 Small search costs
We start the analysis with the assumption that search costs are su¢ ciently small to
be ignored, later they are re-introduced. First, we analyze the problem graphically
by including the ICM constraint, i.e., ￿2 ￿ rm in the indi⁄erence curve graph
(Figure 3), and then we provide analytical results.
18The ICM constraint is satis￿ed for all values of ￿2 above horizontal constraint.
The optimizing choice of ￿3 is where the ICM constraint is tangent to an indi⁄erence
curve. This occurs for the solid indi⁄erence curve in ￿gure 3. As noted above, the
indi⁄erence curve is positively sloped at ￿3 = 0 and negatively sloped at ￿2 = ￿3
implying that the tangency must be at a point where ￿3 > 0 and ￿3 < ￿2. This
means that state 2 should be "worse" than state 3 in the sense that, given assets,
utility and consumption are higher in state 3 than in state 2. It is intuitive (and
easily proved) that ￿2 > ￿3 > 0 implies that b2 ￿s < b3 ￿s < w. The intuition for
this is that when b2￿s = b3￿s, the two unemployment states are, by construction,
identical so that ￿2 = ￿3. Making ￿2 larger than ￿3 requires a reduction in
bene￿ts for short-term unemployed and/or an increase in bene￿ts for long-term
unemployed.
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Figure 3: Indi⁄erence curves and Incentive Constraint for Moving (ICM).
Result 1: If search costs are su¢ ciently low, only the ICM constraint is binding
and bene￿ts should optimally increase over time.
The economic reason for our results can be phrased in the following way. To
19separate individuals with the option of moving from those who have not, a positive
￿2 is required. However, this does not call for an ine¢ cient structure of the bene￿t
schedule. Speci￿cally, starting from a ￿ at bene￿t schedule (along the 45 degree
line where ￿2 = ￿3), the welfare in all states can be increased, while maintaining
the necessary wedge ￿2 = rm, by increasing bene￿ts for long-term unemployed
and reducing bene￿ts for short-term unemployed. The reason for this is that the
expected marginal utility is higher for individuals who have been unemployed for a
long time. The optimum is, however, reached before bene￿ts to long-term unem-
ployed are su¢ ciently high to make the latter indi⁄erent between having a job and
remaining unemployed. On the other hand, when ￿3 = 0 while ￿2 = rm, long-term
unemployed are as well o⁄ as the employed (given assets) and their expected mar-
ginal utility is relatively low. A reallocation from long-term to short-term bene￿ts
therefore increases the value of the insurance so that the tax-cost of providing a
given insurance value can be reduced.
Now, let us derive closed-form solutions to our problem. Using the binding ICM
condition ￿2 = rm to substitute for ￿2, the objective function (14) simpli￿es and
the problem can then be written
max
￿32R+
(
￿3
￿
￿3 ￿ h
e￿￿￿3
￿r
￿
￿ ￿2f
e￿(￿3￿rm)
￿r
)
; (17)
These terms have straightforward interpretations. The ￿rst term is due to the
bene￿t of reducing the tax-cost of long-term bene￿ts. This term is increasing in
￿3, since higher ￿3 is achieved by lower bene￿ts for long-term unemployed, which
reduce taxes in proportion to the ADP of long-term unemployment, ￿3: Note that
this tax reduction comes from two sources; there is a direct e⁄ect that is proportional
to ￿3 but there is also an indirect e⁄ect, captured by the second term inside the
parenthesis. Long-term unemployed ￿nd jobs at a positive rate, h. The prospect of
￿nding a job keeps up consumption, so that it falls less than proportionally to the
reduction in bene￿ts. Conversely, given an increase in ￿3, bene￿ts can be reduced
more than proportionally.
20The second term in (17) is due to the bene￿t of reducing the tax cost of short-
term bene￿ts. It is decreasing in ￿3 since less consumption for long-term unem-
ployed has a negative impact on consumption also of the short-term unemployed,
proportional to f: As ￿3 increases, bene￿ts to the short-term unemployed must
therefore increase to keep ￿2 = rm: This has a tax-cost proportional to the ADP
of short-run unemployment ￿2:
The objective function in (17) is concave in ￿3. Thus, the unique solution to
the problem is obtained by the solution to the ￿rst-order condition, given by
￿￿
3 = ￿
ln
￿q￿ r
2h
￿2 + e￿￿rm ￿h+r
h
￿
￿ r
2h
￿
￿
> 0:
Using the implementation mapping (16), we can ￿nd the optimal insurance
scheme. In particular, in optimum
b￿
3 ￿ b￿
2 = rm ￿ ￿￿
3 +
￿
f + he￿￿￿￿
3
￿ 1 ￿ e￿￿(rm￿￿￿
3)
￿r
> 0: (18)
Notice also that since the solution for ￿3 is independent of f, the di⁄erence b3￿b2
should increase in f. It can be shown that the derivative of the objective function
with respect to f is always positive. Low values of f is an ine¢ cient way of inducing
separation between those who can move and those who cannot, as agents expect
to spend a longer stochastic time su⁄ering the low short-run bene￿ts. Without
formally showing this, we conjecture that if lump-sum bene￿ts were allowed, the
best policy would be to punish unemployment by a lump-sum unemployment tax
when an individual becomes unemployed. In reality, however, it may be politically
di¢ cult or even infeasible to implement a lump-sum punishment on those who lose
their jobs. Furthermore, a lower bound on b2, for example zero, might be imposed
for political reasons, in which case this would pin down an optimal f from (18).
As is clear from the above analysis, a reduction in m reduces ￿2 and allows a
more generous unemployment insurance. Such a reduction could be achieved by
subsidies to moving or retraining. However, full compensation is unlikely to be
21optimal in reality. Suppose, realistically, that individuals with a job sometimes ex-
perience a preference or productivity shock, making another job or a job in another
location more attractive than the current one. Suppose also that these shocks are
not su¢ ciently large to induce voluntary separation and moving if the individual
must pay the moving cost herself. Clearly, such moves are then not socially opti-
mal. The insurer would like to fully subsidize the moving cost of individuals who
are involuntarily separated from their job, but not subsidize it for individuals who
voluntary separate to claim the subsidy. However, this is is infeasible if the insurer
cannot distinguish voluntary and involuntary separations. Therefore, we argue that
although partial subsidies may be feasible and, in fact, observed in reality, full sub-
sidization is unrealistic. More speci￿cally, it seems clear that subsidies should be as
large as possible, without inducing ine¢ cient voluntary separation. Thus, we could
interpret m as the cost of moving or retraining, net the optimal subsidy. Further-
more, a large subsidy to moving might lead unemployed individuals to claim the
subsidy, which is likely to be ine¢ cient. This issue is analyzed below in section 5.4.
4.2 Larger search costs
We can now easily analyze the conditions such that IC2 and IC3 are satis￿ed,
despite positive search costs. Graphically, the constraints are simply horizontal and
vertical lines and all values of ￿2(￿3) above (to the right of) these lines imply that
the respective constraints are satis￿ed. If search costs are su¢ ciently small, none
of the search constraints bind, as shown in ￿gure 4, where IC2 is slack while IC3
almost binds at the tangency between ICM and an indi⁄erence curve. This occurs
at the point indicated by the arrow on the solid indi⁄erence curve.
Increasing search costs shift out IC2 and IC3 since from (15) we see that the
RHS is increasing in s. Eventually (for a search cost which is su¢ ciently large)
IC3 is no longer satis￿ed at the point where the ICM constraint is tangent to the
indi⁄erence curve. This situation is depicted in ￿gure 5. Here, the point where
the ICM is tangent to the most outward dotted indi⁄erence curve satis￿es the IC2
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Figure 4: Low search costs
constraint, but not the IC3 constraint. Thus, ￿3 must be increased but since the
IC3 and the ICM constraint are orthogonal, ￿2 need not be changed. The optimal
point is where the ICM and the IC3 constraint cross. This point is indicated by
the arrow and on the solid indi⁄erence curve. Clearly, ￿3 remains smaller than ￿2
implying an upward sloping bene￿t pro￿le, i.e., b2 < b3: Speci￿cally, ￿2 should be
set equal to rm and ￿3 equal to ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿
￿rs
h
￿
. This means that individuals will
be indi⁄erent in the choice of moving and that long-term unemployed are indi⁄erent
to searching, while the short-term unemployed strictly prefer to search.
Result 2: For an intermediate range of search costs, the ICM and the IC3
constraints are binding and bene￿ts should optimally increase over time.
A further increase in search costs will eventually call for a situation like that
in ￿gure 6. Here, both search constraints bind, while the moving constraint is
slack. Once more, the optimum is indicated by the arrow and on the solid indi⁄er-
ence curve. Bene￿ts are constant and given by expression (13) since ￿2 = ￿3 =
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Figure 5: Moderate search costs
￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿
￿rs
h
￿
:17 We conclude:
Result 3: For su¢ ciently high search costs, the IC2 and the IC3 constraints
are binding and bene￿ts should optimally be constant over time.
The conclusion so far is that when the moving cost is large relative to the search
costs, then the optimal unemployment insurance scheme involves an increasing ben-
e￿t pro￿le in order to, on the one hand, generate incentives to move for those agents
who can and, on the other hand, not too much limiting insurance for the possibility
that an unemployment period becomes long-lasting.
If the search costs are su¢ ciently high relative to the moving cost, strong search
incentives are needed and the moving constraint is slack. In this case, the optimal
bene￿t pro￿le is ￿ at. The intuition behind this result is that, one the one hand,
search incentives are strengthened by falling bene￿ts. On the other hand, when
private savings are allowed, bu⁄er stock savings provide a good substitute for short
17This is a special case of results in Werning (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2005) showing
that constant bene￿ts are optimal under CARA utility in a general class of UI-schemes.
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Figure 6: High search costs.
but not for long unemployment spells, calling for an upward sloping bene￿t pro￿le.
These two e⁄ects cancel exactly under CARA utility. With other utility functions
both e⁄ects are present but will in general not cancel each other.18
5 Extensions
In this section, we will extend and generalize the model in a few directions. We
show that the applicability of the approach is more general than to the particular
case analyzed above.
5.1 Continuously arriving moving opportunities
The analysis in the previous section was done under the assumption that moving
opportunities arise immediately upon separation. In this subsection, we relax this
assumption, now allowing a ￿nite arrival rate of moving opportunities. As above, we
18See Hassler and Rodr￿guez Mora (1999) for an analysis of the relative value of insurance against
long and short unemployment spells under CARA and CRRA utility.
25allow heterogeneity among unemployed in the sense that only a share p of individuals
who loose their job might eventually receive such moving opportunities. We call
such individuals unemployed of type M (movers) while individuals who will never
get moving opportunities are called unemployed of type S (stayers).
Unemployed of type M get opportunities to move with an arrival rate ￿; pro-
vided that they exert search e⁄ort. If such an opportunity arises, the individual
choose if she wants to pay the moving cost m, in which case she immediately gets
a job. All unemployed individuals, regardless of type, also get job opportunities
with arrival rate h; provided that they exert search e⁄ort. The labor market status
can now take 5 values, employed (1), short-term unemployed mover (M,2), long-
term unemployed mover (M,3), short-term unemployed stayer (S,2) and long-term
unemployed stayer (S,3). The corresponding consumption constants are denoted
f￿1;￿M;2;￿M;3;￿S;2;￿S;3g and in direct analogy with (6) they must satisfy
￿1 = w ￿ ￿ ￿ q
￿
pe￿￿M;2 + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿S;2 ￿ 1
￿
￿r
;
￿S;2 = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿S;2￿
￿r
￿
f
￿
e￿(￿S;3￿￿S;2) ￿ 1
￿
￿r
;
￿S;3 = b3 ￿ s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿S;3￿
￿r
; (19)
￿M;2 = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿M;2￿rm)
￿
￿r
+
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿M;2￿
￿r
;
￿
f
￿
e￿(￿M;3￿￿M;2) ￿ 1
￿
￿r
;
￿M;3 = b3 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿M;3￿rm)
￿
￿r
+
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿M;3￿
￿r
;
where ￿j;k ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿j;k for j 2 fS;Mg and k 2 f1;2g:
Now, it is immediate that the incentive constraints for moving is ￿M;2;￿M;3 ￿
rm i.e., that utility increases if an option to move is executed at cost m: Furthermore,
if rm ￿ ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ ; the moving constraints will bind, i.e., ￿M;2 = ￿M;3 = rm:
Since moving provides no extra utility, the utility of stayers is the same as of movers,
as is the value of searching. Given that the moving constraints bind, all incentive
26constraints for search are identical given by
￿j;k ￿ ￿
ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s
h
￿
￿
;
which are satis￿ed under the assumption rm ￿ ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ :
In ￿gure 7 we illustrate this case. We label the ICM constraints for short-term
and long term unemployed by ICM2 and ICM3 respectively. These constraints are
satis￿ed in the area above and to the right of ICM2 and ICM3. The fact that
the indi⁄erence curves are negatively sloped along the 45 degree line implies that
welfare is maximized at the corner ￿j;k = rm; indicated by the arrow. In this case,
bene￿ts are constant at the level given by (12).19
If search cost are su¢ ciently high, i.e., rm < ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ ; the moving constraints
(ICM2 and ICM3) are slack while the search constraints (IC2 and IC3) of the stayers
will bind. The search constraints of the movers will be slack. The reason for this is
that the value of search is larger for movers due to the fact that an extra bene￿t of
searching for them is that it generates a ￿ ow of moving opportunities with positive
value. In this case, the solution is at the corner given by ￿S;2 = ￿S;3 = ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ :
There is then no closed form solution for b2; but it can easily be found numerically
by substituting ￿S;2 = ￿S;3 = ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ into (19) noting that ￿M;2 = ￿M;3 and
solving for the values of ￿M;2 and b2:
Our conclusion so far in this subsection is that if moving opportunities arrive at
a ￿nite rate, this adds an incentive constraint associated with long-term unemployed
moving ￿a second ICM constraint. This new constraint implies that bene￿ts should
be constant over time.
The cost of not satisfying the added constraint is that long-term unemployed
who get moving opportunities decline these, which ceteris paribus increases taxes.
19To see this, substitute rm for all ￿j;k in (19) which then reduces to
￿1 = w ￿ ￿ ￿ q
(e
￿rm ￿ 1)
￿r
;
￿j;k = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ e
￿￿rm￿
￿r
:
Set the di⁄erence to rm and solve for b2:
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Figure 7: The moving constraints bind for both short-term and long-term unem-
ployed.
However, if ￿ is high relative to f; the mass of long-term unemployed of type M
(movers) is small and the increased tax burden associated with not meeting their
incentive constraint may be small. We should note that this contrasts sharply
with a violation of the search constraint for the long-term unemployed. If this is
not satis￿ed, every individual in the economy will eventually end up unemployed
forever.
The potentially lower cost of violating the second ICM constraint implies that
we may need to check whether welfare actually is higher if this incentive constraint
is dropped. In such a case we are back to the analysis in the previous section.
Numerical methods are most convenient to de￿ne the set of parameters for which
this is the case.20 An interesting potential consequence of violating the second
ICM constraint is that this provides an argument for reducing f; i.e., increasing the
20It should be noted that if p is low and m large, it could for the same reason be optimal to
disregard all incentive constraints for moving.
28duration of short-term bene￿ts. By doing this, a larger share of unemployed of type
M will have had time to ￿nd a moving opportunity and left unemployment. We
conjecture that for this reason, there may in this case be an interior solution to the
optimal choice of f:
5.2 Continuous search e⁄ort
We have so far assumed that search e⁄ort is dichotomous, either high or zero. This
has made it possible to de￿ne incentive compatibility (IC) constraints for search. In
reality, however, it may perhaps be more reasonable to assume that search e⁄ort is
a continuous variable. In this subsection, we will therefore assume that unemployed
can choose the hiring rate and that the search cost is an increasing and convex
function of the hiring rate, denoted s(h): We can now no longer de￿ne IC constraints
as in the previous section. Instead, there is a smooth trade-o⁄ between insurance
and search incentives.
The consumption constants still satisfy (6), with s replaced by s(h): Further-
more, short-term and long-term unemployed choose their hiring rate, denoted h2
and h3; respectively. The ￿rst order conditions for these choices are
s0 (h2) =
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2
￿r
;
s0 (h3) =
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3
￿r
:
The fact that h2 and h3 may di⁄er a⁄ects the calculation of ￿2 and ￿3; now
becoming21
￿2 =
(h3 + r)(1 ￿ p)q￿2￿1
(r ￿ ￿2)(r ￿ ￿1)((1 ￿ p)q (f + h3) + h3 (f + h2))
￿3 = ￿2
f
h3 + r
21To derive these, we solve the linear system of di⁄erential equations governing the dynamics
of ￿2;t and ￿3;t using ￿2;0 = ￿3;0 = 0 as initial conditions. After solving this, it is immediate to
calculate r
R 1
0 e
￿rt￿2;tdt and r
R 1
0 e
￿rt￿3;tdt. Proof available upon request.
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where ￿1;￿2 are the roots of the dynamic system for ￿2;t and ￿3;t: Since the privately
chosen h2 and h3 depend on ￿2 and ￿3; so do ￿2 and ￿3: Increasing ￿2 and ￿3;
i.e., reducing the value of unemployment insurance, now has a smooth positive
e⁄ect on hiring rates and thereby a negative e⁄ect on the tax rate. Generically, the
optimal unemployment insurance in absence of incentive constraints for moving will
therefore, as is well known, involve strictly positive values of ￿2 and ￿3; i.e., less
than full insurance. As before, we can construct indi⁄erence curves in ￿2;￿3 space
and in this space introduce the ICM constraint, ￿2 = rm: This is done in Figure
8.22
In contrast to the case in the previous section, indi⁄erence curves are now cen-
tered around a bliss-point with strictly positive ￿2 and ￿3 since the negative e⁄ect
on search is taken into account. The ICM constraint binds if it is above the bliss
point (rm > 0:053 in the graph). If, in addition, the tangency between the ICM
constraint and the relevant indi⁄erence curve occurs above the 45 degree line, opti-
22We used the e⁄ort cost function s(h) =
sh2
2 and the parameters; f = 1; q = 0:1; r = 0:05;
￿ = 1; p = :5; w = 1; m = 4;s = 1:
30mal unemployment insurance requires ￿2 > ￿3; i.e., b2 < b3:We have not been able
to prove that this is always going to be the case.23 However, we do show that it is
a possibility.
The intuition for our result is straightforward and builds on the intuition de-
veloped in the previous section. A binding ICM constraint implies that insurance
to short-term unemployed must be more limited than what is required to induce
the second-best amount of search e⁄ort in absence of the ICM constraint. This,
however, does not imply that also the insurance for long-term unemployed must be
reduced below what is required to induce the right amount of search e⁄ort.
5.3 Loss of skills and long-term unemployment
So far, we have considered the third state as an administrative state, used as a
proxy for the unemployment duration of the agent. Unemployment was assumed
to have no other e⁄ect than depleting the ￿nancial assets of the agent; hiring rates
and search costs remained constant. However, it is easy to relax this assumption
and analyze how the path of bene￿ts should be constructed if the unemployment
duration also has real direct e⁄ects on, e.g., search costs and hiring probabilities.24
Speci￿cally, let s2 and s3 denote the search costs in states 2 and 3 and, correspond-
ingly, h2 and h3 denote the state dependent hiring probabilities. The idea that the
human capital of the unemployed depreciates during the unemployment spell (or
that the individual "learns how to be unemployed") is captured by the assumption
h2 > h3 and/or s2 < s3; implying s2
h2 < s3
h3:
23The results in Werning (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2005) imply that the bliss-point occurs
at the 45 degree line. We conjecture that this implies that indi⁄erence curves are negatively sloped
along this line.
24Similarily, we could easily analyze the case when the prospective wage depends on unemploy-
ment duration.
31It is straightforward to show that the IC2 and IC3 constraints now become
￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r
s2
h2
￿
;
￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r
s3
h3
￿
;
respectively, where ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s2
h2
￿
< ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s3
h3
￿
so that the IC3 con-
straint crosses the IC2 condition below the 45 degree line. If the binding constraints
are IC2 and IC3 (small moving costs), we must then ￿3 > ￿2: Using the imple-
mentation equations (using the di⁄erent search costs and hiring rates), we ￿nd that
in this case, the optimal bene￿t schedule should be downward sloping (b2 > b3). If
the ICM constraint binds, rather than IC2, the possibility that the optimal bene￿t
pro￿le should be upward sloping remains.
5.4 A menu of contracts
Finally let us note that our model can also easily handle more complicated UI
schemes, e.g., menus.25 In particular, let us consider the case when the insurer
allows individuals losing their job to either get a lump-sum transfer T, or a possibly
non-constant UI-bene￿t stream.26 Since the e⁄ective cost of moving is now m ￿ T;
the incentive constraint for individuals with the opportunity to move now becomes,
￿2 = r(m ￿ T);
i.e., a positive T slackens the constraint (moves it down in the ￿gures). Increasing
T to a su¢ ciently large extent leads to a situation like that in ￿gure 6, where IC2
and IC3 bind. Potentially, its optimal to set T = m ￿full subsidization. This is
the case if unemployed without moving opportunities prefer UI bene￿ts over T, so
that a separation between the groups is achieved also when the moving cost is fully
25Some UI schemes o⁄er this type of menus; in particular, in the period of large unemployment
(end of the 80￿ s and beginning of the 90￿ s) the Spanish Unemployment agency o⁄ered the option
of a lump-sum transfer or standard UI payments.
26For simplicity, let us disregard the case of voluntary separations as discussed above.
32insured. If such separation is not achieved under full insurance but should be in
optimum, T must be reduced so that unemployed individuals choose UI bene￿ts.
We note that we cannot increase the relative attractiveness of UI-bene￿ts by raising
the latter, since this would violate the IC2 and IC3 conditions, which continue to
bind.
To analyze whether separation is achieved, we need to add another state to the
analysis, namely to be unemployed without bene￿t, which makes a two-dimensional
graphical analysis impractical. The analytical analysis remains simple, however.
Setting the income of unemployed to zero, the consumption constant associated
with being unemployed without bene￿ts is given by
￿u = ￿s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿1￿￿u)￿
￿r
;
so that ￿u is a function of ￿1 only. The incentive constraint implying that unem-
ployed do not choose the lump-sum transfer is then ￿2 ￿ ￿u ￿ rT; and it is easily
checked if this is satis￿ed in the equilibrium. If not, T must be reduced. If the ICM
condition is slack, bene￿ts should be constant. However, as T is reduced, the ICM
condition might eventually bind, once more calling for an upward sloping bene￿t
schedule.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that there are reasons to believe that an important
informational problem associated with unemployment insurance has been neglected
in the previous literature. This problem stems from the fact that unemployed
individuals sometimes have the option of making an investment that could increase
their chances of ￿nding a job. Examples of such investments are retraining and
moving to another location. Since it is reasonable to assume that it is di¢ cult or
impossible to observe who has these options, the UI system should give incentives
for people to take advantage of any reasonable option to increase their labor market
prospects. If such options arrive at a reasonably high rate or exist already at the
33onset of the unemployment spell, this can have important qualitative implications
for how the UI system should be designed.
By deriving graphical and analytical closed-form solutions, we have shown how
a simple UI system should be constructed to provide su¢ cient incentives to move
or retrain without excessively reducing the insurance value of the unemployment
bene￿ts. Unless the hiring rates of long-term unemployed are very low and search
costs too high, this requires an initial period of relatively low bene￿ts. The intuition
here is straightforward, by setting initial bene￿ts at a low level, individuals with
good opportunities to get new jobs are induced to exploit these and quickly leave
the pool of unemployed. On the other hand, individuals with worse opportunities
value insurance against long-term unemployment more than insurance against short-
term unemployment. The value of the UI system can therefore be maintained by
providing more generous bene￿ts for long-term unemployment, calling for an upward
sloping bene￿t pro￿le.
We have assumed that individuals can self-insure via unobservable savings,
i.e., that individual consumption is unobservable or, for some other reason, non-
contractable. If, in contrast, the insurer has control over the consumption of the
individual, it is well known that a downward sloping path of consumption (and ben-
e￿ts, if the individual has no other income) provides the best trade-o⁄between good
search incentives and insurance. In a working paper version of this paper (Hassler
and Rodr￿guez Mora (2003)), we analyze the case when individuals have no access
to a market for saving and borrowing. In this case, we show that it is optimal
to have constant bene￿ts if the moving constraint binds while search constraints
are slack. The reason for this is that there is no point in punishing unsuccessful
search by reducing consumption as the unemployment spell continues if the search
constraints are slack anyhow.
With savings, the downward sloping consumption pro￿le is achieved voluntar-
ily as individuals deplete their assets. This is true in general but under CARA
preferences, the downward slope of consumption that is optimal with search moral
34hazard is achieved with constant bene￿ts. Under the perhaps more realistic as-
sumption of constant relative risk-aversion, the analysis is greatly complicated by
the fact that search incentives would depend on asset holdings. Therefore, incentive
compatibility would not in general be consistent with bene￿ts that are independent
of individual asset holdings. However, the intuition for the results in this paper does
not appear to be related to such e⁄ects. In our model, the preference for increasing
bene￿ts arises from the need to separate between the two types of workers and the
fact that individual assets are depleted during unemployment, (which is true for
general speci￿cations of utility, in particular for CRRA, as shown in e.g., Hassler
and Rodr￿guez Mora (1999)). Both mechanisms are likely to be present also under
more general preference speci￿cations. However, since search incentives in general
depend on asset holdings and the duration of unemployment is likely to be corre-
lated with the individual￿ s asset holdings, unobservability of the latter may have
consequences for optimal bene￿t time pro￿les. For example, if the search incentives
are reinforced as wealth is depleted and individuals with long unemployment spells
are likely to have less wealth, this might strengthen the case for increasing bene￿ts.
On the other hand, with wealth e⁄ects present, it could also be the case that indi-
viduals with opportunities to move do not not do so until their assets are run down
su¢ ciently. An initial period of low bene￿ts may then not be su¢ cient to separate
individuals who can move from those who cannot and upward sloping bene￿ts could
be suboptimal.
We have argued that under some circumstances, upward sloping bene￿ts could
be optimal, challenging the conventional wisdom that bene￿ts should fall over the
unemployment spell. We ￿nally want to provide some word of caution. Neither the
assumptions we have used nor the ones used to derive the conventional wisdom are
perfectly realistic. The incentive problems operating during an unemployment spell
are individual speci￿c, time varying and wealth dependent. The moving costs is
not a constant, but rather speci￿c to the particular moving opportunity and search
intensity is not dichotomous. Furthermore, the market for borrowing and saving is
35neither perfect nor non-existent and CRRA is probably a better description of pref-
erences than CARA. Therefore, wealth e⁄ects are likely to be present and incentive
constraints cannot not always be assumed to either bind or be slack, as done here
and in much of the literature. Our ￿nal conclusion is therefore that while stylized
models like ours can provide qualitative results that may prove important to guide
research, calibrated, numerical models are needed to weigh together mechanisms
pulling in di⁄erent directions so that quantitative policy recommendations can be
derived. This is left to future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Bellman equations and consumption constants
We start by conjecturing that the value function can be written ￿e￿￿(rAt+￿j) for
the undetermined coe¢ cients ￿j;j 2 f1;2;3g: We also conjecture that consumption
net of interest rates, i.e., ￿j = ct;j ￿ rAt is independent of assets. The proof then
proceeds by showing that this consumption rule maximizes the Bellman equations
and that the Bellman equations are satis￿ed for a unique set of ￿s
j:
38The Bellman equation of an employed individual is
￿
1
r
e￿￿(rAt+￿1) = max
￿
￿e￿￿(rAt+￿)dt ￿ (1 ￿ rdt)(1 ￿ qdt)
1
r
e￿￿(rAt+dt+￿1)
￿ (1 ￿ rdt)qdt
1
r
h
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿(rAt+dt+￿2) + pe￿￿(rAt+dt￿m+￿2)
i
:
Using the budget constraint, At+dt = At +r(w ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)dt, and dividing by e￿￿rAt;
this becomes
￿
1
r
e￿￿￿1 = max
￿
￿e￿￿￿dt ￿ (1 ￿ rdt)(1 ￿ qdt)
1
r
e￿￿(r(w￿￿￿￿)dt+￿1)
￿ (1 ￿ rdt)qdt
1
r
h
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿(r(w￿￿￿￿)dt+￿2) + pe￿￿(r(w￿￿￿￿)dt￿rm+￿1)
i
:
Using the ￿rst-order linear approximation, e￿￿(r(w￿￿￿￿)dt+￿1) ￿ e￿￿￿1￿￿r(w ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)dte￿￿￿1,
adding 1
re￿￿￿1 to both sides, dividing by dt and letting dt approach zero, yields
0 = max
￿
n
￿re￿￿(￿￿￿1) + r + ￿r(w ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
o
(20)
+ q
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)e￿￿(￿2￿￿1) ￿ pe￿rm
￿
Similarly, for the short-term and long-run unemployed, we obtain
0 = max
￿
n
￿re￿￿(￿￿￿2) + ￿r(b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
o
(21)
+ r + h + f ￿ he￿￿(￿1￿￿2) ￿ fe￿￿(￿3￿￿2)
0 = max
￿
n
￿re￿￿(￿￿￿3) + ￿r(b3 ￿ s ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
o
(22)
+ r + h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿1￿￿3)
￿
:
Equations (20) and (21) are maximized at ￿ = ￿j; implying that these values
maximize the RHS￿ s of the Bellman equations.
Substituting ￿1;￿2;￿3;respectively for ￿ in (20), (21) and (22) solves the max-
ima. Finally, solving for gives the ￿s
j gives (6), which by construction then solves
the Bellman equations.
Taking the di⁄erence between line 1 and 2 and between 1 and 3 in (6) and
solving for b2 and b3; we obtain the implementation mapping (16).
397.2 The IC2 and IC3 conditions
We ￿rst note if a long-term unemployed does not search, she gets an income b3 ￿
￿ forever, implying a utility ￿1
re￿￿rAte￿￿(b3￿￿); while she gets ￿1
re￿￿rAte￿￿￿3 if
she searches. Therefore, we need ￿3 ￿ b3 ￿ ￿ to induce search of the long-term
unemployed. Using (6), this implies
￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r
s
h
￿
; (23)
which is the IC3-condition.
For the short-term unemployed, we compute the value associated with a one-
period deviation, i.e., no search in the current employment state, conditional on
searching in future states. This value is ￿e￿￿rAte
￿￿c2;n
r , where ￿2;n satis￿es
￿2;n = b2 ￿ ￿ +
f
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿3￿￿2;n)￿
￿r
:
The IC2 constraint is given by
￿2 ￿ ￿2;n ￿ 0:
Furthermore,
￿2 ￿ ￿2;n =
 
￿s +
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿r
￿
f
￿
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ e￿￿(￿3￿￿2;n)￿
￿r
!
(24)
=
￿
￿s +
h
￿r
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿
f
￿r
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿2￿￿2;n)
￿￿
￿ R(￿2 ￿ ￿2;n)
Clearly, R is a monotonously decreasing function with a horizontal asymp-
tote at ￿s + h
￿r
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿
f
￿re￿(￿3￿￿2) (achieved as ￿2 ￿ ￿2;n approaches in-
￿nity), approaches in￿nity as ￿2 ￿ ￿2;n approaches minus in￿nity and R(0) =
￿s + h
￿r
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
. The solution to (24) is the unique ￿xed-point of R. This
value is non-negative if and only if ￿s + h
￿r
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿ 0. So
￿2 ￿ ￿2;n , ￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿
￿rs
h
￿
:
408 Proofs not intended for publication
8.1 Proof that results extend to n unemployment states
Suppose we have n states, then the consumption constants are
￿1 = w ￿ ￿ ￿ q
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿r
; (25)
￿2 = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2
￿r
￿ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
;
￿3 = b3 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3
￿r
￿ f3
e￿(￿4￿￿3) ￿ 1
￿r
(26)
::: (27)
￿n￿1 = bn￿1 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿n￿1
￿r
￿ fn￿1
e￿(￿n￿￿n￿1) ￿ 1
￿r
(28)
￿n = bn ￿ s ￿ ￿ + h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿n
￿r
:
Now, ￿ =
Pn
s=2 bs￿s, and assume the ICM constraint to be binding, so ￿2 = rm,
implying that we should minimize taxes. Using the above, and ￿2 = rm we have
￿2 = w ￿ b2 + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿rm
￿r
+ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
￿3 = w ￿ b3 + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3
￿r
+ f3
e￿(￿4￿￿3) ￿ 1
￿r
:::
￿n￿1 = w ￿ bn￿1 + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿n￿1
￿r
+ fn￿1
e￿(￿n￿￿n￿1) ￿ 1
￿r
￿n = w ￿ bn + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿n)
￿r
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b2 = w ￿ ￿2 + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿rm
￿r
+ f2
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
b3 = w ￿ ￿3 + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3
￿r
+ f3
e￿(￿4￿￿3) ￿ 1
￿r
:::
bn￿1 = w ￿ ￿n￿1 + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿n￿1
￿r
+ fn￿1
e￿(￿n￿￿n￿1) ￿ 1
￿r
bn = w ￿ ￿n + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿n)
￿r
￿ = ￿2
 
w ￿ rm + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿rm
￿r
+ f
e￿(￿3￿rm) ￿ 1
￿r
!
+
n￿1 X
i=3
￿3
 
w ￿ ￿i + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿i
￿r
+ fs
e￿(￿i+1￿￿i) ￿ 1
￿r
!
+ ￿n
￿
w ￿ ￿n + s ￿ q
e￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ h
1 ￿ e￿￿￿n
￿r
￿
Removing constants,
￿ = constant + ￿2
 
f
e￿(￿3￿rm)
￿r
!
+
n￿1 X
i=3
￿i
 
￿￿i + h
e￿￿￿i
￿r
+ fs
e￿(￿i+1￿￿i)
￿r
!
+ ￿n
￿
￿￿n + h
e￿￿￿n
￿r
￿
First-order conditions are
￿i2f3;n￿1g;￿i￿1
fi￿1
r
e￿(￿i￿￿i￿1) ￿ ￿i
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿i￿1 +
fi
r
e￿(￿i￿￿i￿1)
￿
= 0
￿n;￿n￿1
fn￿1
r
e￿(￿n￿￿n￿1) ￿ ￿n
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿n
￿
= 0;
where ￿2 = rm:
42Suppose that this is satis￿ed for ￿3 = ￿4 = :::￿n = ￿:Then,
e￿(￿￿rm) =
r￿3
f2￿2
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
f3
r
￿
fi￿1
r
=
￿i
￿i￿1
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
fi
r
￿
fn￿1
r
=
￿n
￿n￿1
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿
￿
or
e￿(￿￿rm) =
r￿3
f2￿2
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
￿4
￿3
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
f4
r
￿￿
=
r￿3
f2￿2
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
￿4
￿3
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
￿5
￿4
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿ +
f5
r
￿￿￿
=
r
f2
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿
￿￿￿
￿3
￿2
+
￿4
￿3
+ ::: +
￿n￿1
￿n￿2
￿
+
￿n
￿2
￿
=
r
f2
￿
1 +
h
r
e￿￿￿
￿ 
n￿1 X
i=3
￿i
￿i￿1
+
￿n
￿2
!
Clearly, there exists a ￿￿ such that this is satis￿ed, consequently ￿i = ￿￿8i 2
f3;4;:::;ng satis￿es all ￿rst-order conditions. This allocation is then implemented
by a ~ b￿
2 and a constant bene￿t sequence ~ b￿
3 = ~ b￿
4 = :::~ b￿
n. Finally, we note that since
individuals face identical conditions in states 3;:::n; the allocation would not change
if the number of states were reduced as long as n > 3: Thus, the optimal value
of b2 is independent of n if n > 3: Consequently, the optimal bene￿t schedule is to
have b2 = b￿
2 and a constant bene￿t level b3 = b￿
3 thereafter.
8.2 Derivation of (9)
The consumption di⁄erence is
￿2 = w ￿ ￿ ￿ q
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿(￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
￿
 
b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + h
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿2)
￿r
!
= w ￿ b2 + s ￿ q
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿(￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
￿
 
h
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿2)
￿r
!
;
giving
b2 = w + s ￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿
h
￿r
￿ ￿2 ￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
+
he￿￿￿2
￿r
:
43Collecting constants we get
￿1 = w ￿ ￿2
￿
w + s ￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿
h
￿r
￿ ￿2 ￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
+
he￿￿￿2
￿r
￿
￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
= w ￿ ￿2
￿
w + s ￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿
h
￿r
￿
￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
+ ￿2
￿
￿2 + q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
￿
he￿￿￿2
￿r
￿
￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
= ￿ + ￿2
￿
￿2 + q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
￿
he￿￿￿2
￿r
￿
￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
= ￿ + ￿2
￿
￿2 ￿
he￿￿￿2
￿r
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
:
8.3 Derivation of 14
Doing the substitution in the text and collecting endogenous terms, we have
￿1 = w ￿ ￿2
￿
w + s ￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ (h + f)
1
￿r
￿
￿ ￿3
￿
w + s ￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿
h
￿r
￿
￿ q
pe￿rm ￿ 1
￿r
￿ ￿2
 
￿￿2 ￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
+ h
e￿￿￿2
￿r
+ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
￿r
!
￿ ￿3
￿
￿￿3 ￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
+ h
e￿￿￿3
￿r
￿
￿ q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
= ￿2 + ￿2￿2 + ￿3￿3 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3)q
(1 ￿ p)e￿￿2
￿r
￿ ￿2
 
h
e￿￿￿2
￿r
+ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
￿r
!
￿ ￿3h
e￿￿￿3
￿r
:
8.4 Indi⁄erence curves
The objective function is
￿1 = ￿2 + ￿2￿2 + ￿3￿3 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3)
q (1 ￿ p)
￿r
e￿￿2 (29)
￿ ￿2
 
h
e￿￿￿2
￿r
+ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
￿r
!
￿ ￿3h
e￿￿￿3
￿r
:
44Di⁄erentiation gives
 
￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3)
q (1 ￿ p)
r
e￿￿2 + ￿2h
e￿￿￿2
r
+ ￿2f
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
r
!
d￿2
= ￿
 
￿3 ￿ ￿2f
e￿(￿3￿￿2)
r
+ ￿3h
e￿￿￿3
r
!
d￿3
d￿2
d￿3
j￿1constant = ￿
￿
￿3 ￿ ￿2f e￿(￿3￿￿2)
r + ￿3he￿￿￿3
r
￿
￿
￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3)
q(1￿p)
r e￿￿2 + ￿2he￿￿￿2
r + ￿2f e￿(￿3￿￿2)
r
￿
= ￿
f
h+r ￿ 1
r
￿
fe￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿
fh
h+re￿￿￿3
￿
1 ￿ 1
r
￿
(r + h + f)e￿￿2 ￿ he￿￿￿2 ￿ fe￿(￿3￿￿2)￿
8.5 Di⁄erent search and hiring probabilities
Here, we formally analyze the case when s and h are state dependent. We ￿rst have
that
￿1 = w ￿ ￿ ￿ q
pe￿rm + (1 ￿ p)e￿(￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
; (30)
￿2 = b2 ￿ s2 ￿ ￿ + h2
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿2)
￿r
￿ f
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿r
;
￿3 = b3 ￿ s3 ￿ ￿ + h3
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿3)
￿r
(31)
The IC2 and IC3 conditions are
￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r
s2
h2
￿
￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r
s3
h3
￿
and the implementation equations
b2 = w + s2 ￿ ￿2 ￿
q
￿
e￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿
+ h2
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿2￿
￿ f
￿
e￿(￿3￿￿2) ￿ 1
￿
￿r
b3 = w + s3 ￿ ￿3 ￿
q
￿
e￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿
+ h3
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3￿
￿r
: (32)
45Fixing ￿2 and assuming that s3 increases while respecting ￿3 = ￿￿￿1 ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s3
h3
￿
,
we see that
db2
ds3
=
@b2
@￿3
@￿3
@s3
=
fe￿(￿3￿￿2)
r
r
h3 ￿ ￿rs3
=
fe￿(￿3￿￿2)
h3
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s3
h3
￿ > 0;
db3
ds3
= 1 ￿
@￿3
@s3
￿
1 +
h3e￿￿￿3
r
￿
= 1 ￿
r
h3 ￿ ￿rs3
r + h3e￿￿￿3
r
= 1 ￿
r
h3 ￿ ￿rs3
r + h3
h3￿￿rs3
h3
r
= ￿
r
h3
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s3
h3
￿ < 0:
Similarly,
db2
dh3
=
@b2
@￿3
@￿3
@h3
=
fe￿(￿3￿￿2)
r
￿rs3
h2
3
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s3
h3
￿ < 0:
db3
dh3
= ￿
@￿3
@h3
￿
1 +
h3e￿￿￿3
r
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿3￿
￿r
=
rs3
h3 (h3 ￿ ￿rs3)
r + h3e
ln
￿
1￿￿r
s3
h3
￿
r
￿
￿
1 ￿ e
ln
￿
1￿￿r
s3
h3
￿￿
￿r
=
rs3
h2
3
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s3
h3
￿ > 0:
8.6 The search constraints binds in the case of ￿nite arrival rates
of moving opportunities
Substituting ￿S;2 = ￿S;3 = ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ in (19) yields
￿1 = w ￿ ￿ ￿ q
￿
pe￿￿M;2 + (1 ￿ p)e￿ln(1￿￿r s
h) ￿ 1
￿
￿r
￿S;2 = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ +
h
￿
1 ￿ eln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿
￿r
￿M;2 = b2 ￿ s ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿M;2￿rm)
￿
￿r
+
h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿M;2￿
￿r
46Furthermore, setting the di⁄erence between line 1 and 2 to ￿
ln(1￿￿r s
h)
￿ and the
di⁄erence between line 1 and 3 to ￿￿M;2 gives
￿
ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿r s
h
￿
￿
= w ￿ b2 ￿ q
￿
pe￿￿M;2 +
(1￿p)h
h￿￿rs ￿ 1
￿
￿r
￿M;2 =
0
@w ￿ (b2 ￿ s) ￿
q
￿
pe￿￿M;2 +
(1￿p)h
h￿￿rs ￿ 1
￿
+ ￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿M;2￿rm)
￿
+ h
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿M;2￿
￿r
1
A
which we need to solve numerically to get the two undetermined values ￿M;2 and
b2:
8.7 Calculation of ￿2 and ￿3
To analyze the budget constraint we recall that we de￿ned ￿2;t and ￿3;t as the mass
of short-term and long-term unemployed, respectively. The law-of-motion for these
variables (when the ICM constraint is satis￿ed) is
￿2;t+dt = (1 ￿ p)qdt(1 ￿ ￿2;t ￿ ￿3;t) + (1 ￿ h2dt ￿ fdt)￿2;t
￿3;t+dt = fdt￿2;t + (1 ￿ h3dt)￿3;t
or
￿2;t+dt ￿ ￿2;t
dt
= ￿(1 ￿ p)q￿2;t ￿ (1 ￿ p)q￿3;t ￿ (h2 + f)￿2;t + (1 ￿ p)q (33)
￿3;t+dt ￿ ￿3;t
dt
= f￿2;t ￿ h3￿3;t (34)
taking the limit as dt ! 0 yields
2
4 _ ￿2;t
_ ￿2;t
3
5 =
2
4 ￿((1 ￿ p)q + h2 + f) ￿(1 ￿ p)q
f ￿h3
3
5
2
4 ￿2;t
￿3;t
3
5+
2
4 (1 ￿ p)q
0
3
5; (35)
with roots
￿1;2 = ￿
F ￿
q
(f + q (1 ￿ p) + h2 + h3)
2 ￿ 4(q (f + h3)(1 ￿ p) + h3 (f + h2))
2
where F ￿ (f + q (1 ￿ p) + h3 + h2) and eigenvectors:
8
<
:
2
4
￿1+h3
f
1
3
5
9
=
;
$ ￿1;
8
<
:
2
4
￿2+h3
f
1
3
5
9
=
;
$
￿2:
47The steady state is
2
4 ￿ ￿2
￿ ￿3
3
5 = ￿
2
4 ￿((1 ￿ p)q + h2 + f) ￿(1 ￿ p)q
f ￿h3
3
5
￿1 2
4 (1 ￿ p)q
0
3
5
=
2
4
h3(1￿p)q
q(1￿p)(h3+f)+(h2+f)h3
f(1￿p)q
q(1￿p)(h3+f)+(h2+f)h3
3
5:
The solution to the system is then
2
4 ￿2;t
￿3;t
3
5 =
2
4
￿1+h3
f
￿2+h3
f
1 1
3
5
2
4 c1e￿1t
c2e￿2t
3
5 +
2
4 ￿ ￿2
￿ ￿3
3
5:
Solving for the ex-ante case when individuals are born employed (￿2;0 = ￿3;0 = 0)
yields
2
4 0
0
3
5 =
2
4
￿1+h3
f
￿2+h3
f
1 1
3
5
2
4 c1
c2
3
5 +
2
4 ￿ ￿2
￿ ￿3
3
5;
)
2
4 c1
c2
3
5 = ￿
2
4
￿1+h3
f
￿2+h3
f
1 1
3
5
￿1 2
4 ￿ ￿2
￿ ￿3
3
5 =
2
4
(￿2+h3)￿3￿f￿ ￿2
￿1￿￿2
f￿ ￿2￿(h3+￿1)￿3
￿1￿￿2
3
5:
Thus, the complete solution is
2
4 ￿2;t
￿3;t
3
5 =
2
4
￿1+h3
f
￿2+h3
f
1 1
3
5
2
4
(￿2+h3)￿3￿f￿ ￿2
￿1￿￿2 e￿1t
f￿ ￿2￿(h3+￿1)￿3
￿1￿￿2 e￿2t
3
5
+
2
4 ￿ ￿2
￿ ￿3
3
5
￿2;t =
￿1 + h3
f
￿ ￿3 (￿2 + h3) ￿ f￿ ￿2
￿1 ￿ ￿2
e￿1t
+
￿2 + h3
f
f￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿3 (h3 + ￿1)
￿1 ￿ ￿2
e￿2t + ￿ ￿2
￿3;t =
￿ ￿3 (￿2 + h3) ￿ f￿ ￿2
￿1 ￿ ￿2
e￿1t
+
f￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿3 (￿1 + h3)
￿1 ￿ ￿2
e￿2t + ￿ ￿3
48We can now calculate ￿2 and ￿3 from
￿2 = r
Z 1
0
e￿rt￿2;tdt
= r
Z 1
0
￿1 + h3
f
￿ ￿3 (￿2 + h3) ￿ f￿ ￿2
￿1 ￿ ￿2
e(￿1￿r)t
+ r
Z 1
0
￿2 + h3
f
f￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿3 (h3 + ￿1)
￿1 ￿ ￿2
e(￿2￿r)t
+ r
Z 1
0
￿ ￿2e￿rtdt
=
(h3 + r)(1 ￿ p)q￿2￿1
(r ￿ ￿2)(r ￿ ￿1)((1 ￿ p)q (f + h3) + h3 (f + h2))
and similarly
￿3 = r
Z 1
0
e￿rt￿3;tdt
=
f (1 ￿ p)q￿2￿1
(r ￿ ￿2)(r ￿ ￿1)((1 ￿ p)q (f + h3) + h3 (f + h2))
= ￿2
f
h3 + r
:
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